What an amazing
class we had yesterday! We not only discussed extensively on psychoanalysis, moral
dilemma, and dissociation, which appear to be the central themes of this
article, we also incorporated the issue of moral ambiguity, racial and class
distinctions, as well as other sociopolitical perspectives into our classroom
discourse.
I will start my
post by highlighting some interesting viewpoints presented in class. As a psychotherapist,
Straker was forced to confront the moral split within herself when she learned
about the horrifying lynching perpetrated by a client she had been working
closely with, Stanley. Professor Stein pointed out that when dealing with
issues that are not simply black and white, people tend to experience
difficulties in accepting their blurring moral standards and often desperately
wanting to find moral clarity. In Straker’s case, she was torn between
two contrary yet complex feelings about Stanley’s story. No matter what and how
she chooses, she was confronted by moral dilemma. On the one hand, she was
aware of her mentality as a caring psychotherapist who did not want to be
judgmental towards her patient, and she clearly understood that she was in no
position to denounce Stanley’s action because, unlike Stanley, white privileges
have protected her from being harmed by violent political struggles. On the
other hand, Straker was also alerted by the fact that her moral instinct was
barring her from relieving herself from the traumatic impacts of Stanley’s
crime. I want to pause at here for a brief moment, and insert my first
question. Professor Waterston stated
that she was not convince that Straker was being as self reflected as she
intended to be; in other words, she devoted too much attention to speak about
her instinct reaction to Stanley’s behavior rather than closely examine the
source of her moral ambiguity.
(Please correct me if I have misinterpreted your argument, Prof.
Waterston.) So my first question is what is your opinion
on Professor Waterston’s interpretation regarding Straker’s attempt to examine
her inner self.
Stanley was a
leader in the anti-apartheid movement. As an individual who played a
significant role in this collective struggle against state injustice, Stanley
was entrusted with the responsibility of fighting for the sake of his people.
When Maki Skosana allegedly provided intelligence to the enemy and caused the
death of Stanley’s fellow comrades, Stanley’s social self took over the control
of his mind and body and compelled him to fulfill his political obligations and
suppress his inner self. In the process of the lynching ofMaki Skosana, Stanley
experienced a petite moral dilemma. However, as Andre puts it, this brief
experience was like a bump on the road, which had almost no impact on Stanley’s
determination to carry out the execution. On the surface, it appears that
Stanley has showed little concern for his momentary moral ambiguity; still, it
is essential to take the context of Stanley and Straker’s communication into
consideration before making the final judgment. For instance, Stanley chose to speak
about this traumatic episode in his life during a therapy session, which
suggests that it was an issue that he saw as appropriate to be discussed for
therapeutic purpose. Professor Stein, Professor Reitz, as well as few other
students have commented on this issue during the class, and I would like to
give us another opportunity to further explore this question. Here comes my second question. Was
Straker the only person experiencing moral dilemma during that particular
therapy session? If not, is it safe to assume that Stanley’s combative social
identity has expired after the collapse of apartheid, and he is now compelled
to search for the private self that he has lost during the period of political struggles,
namely the innocent Stanley who loves his family and had never kill anyone
before the death of Maki Skosana? When Straker no longer has an evil system,
the apartheid, to justify his murderous behavior as a necessary evil, is he
having difficulties with accepting his past or he is still confident in his choice
of action?
Due to various
limitations, I am unable to discuss every single extraordinary comment made
during the last class. But please feel free to talk about any interested topic
that I might have omitted by chance, and I am looking forward to see the
continuation of our class discussion on the blog.
15 comments:
Thank you, Sylvie for your post and for your questions. I would like to take this opportunity to clarify what I was trying to express which I think is somewhat different from the way Sylvie indicates.
Let me say that my critique of Straker’s paper is not intended as an attack on her character or her intentions. I take at face value what Straker has presented in this paper. I do not know her other work. I have not read her other works. Perhaps this is why I suggested some time ago (as Professor Stein reminded me that I had) that we might also look at something else Straker has published in order to better understand her ideas, thoughts, words. But what we have in front of us is Straker’s piece titled “A Crisis in the Subjectivity of the Analyst: The Trauma of Morality.” And so this is the piece to which I offer my response.
Our class began with questions about and a discussion of a moral dilemma—what is a moral dilemma and what are examples of it? The examples we discussed had to do with an individual making a choice about a future action. Do I “do this” or do I “do that” (the choice is an action—the “doing” of an act—the “this” or the “that”)? Since each future action (or no action for that matter) would have “immoral” consequences, there is a dilemma.
We then moved on to discuss the content of the article, defining and discussing Stanley’s “dissociation” as he recounted the story of his participation in Maki Skosana’s murder. I think we can’t say there was one focus of the discussion—the “focus” was a moving target. This made for a rich discussion.
Among my critiques of Straker’s piece and her position is what Sylvie attempted to note: I do not feel that Straker is as self-reflective as the title of her piece suggests she will be. I believe she raises certain questions and then focuses too much of her attention on Stanley and not on her self. Let me try to explain.
First, going back to the start of our class discussion, I am left confused and wondering about “whose” moral dilemma we are talking about here. Straker’s? Stanley’s? If Stanley, why would she or we be discussing his moral dilemma if the focus of the article is supposed to be Straker’s and other therapists’ struggles and dilemmas that arise in the treatment setting? If Straker’s, what is the choice about a future action she is supposed to be struggling with? I think that this key aspect is muddled in the article. And I think this muddling reflects that Straker is not as self-reflective as the title of her article suggests she will be.
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continued from previous post....
Beginning on p. 159, Straker “turns to her own subjectivity,” and her crisis. However much credit we may give to Straker for attempting to confront her struggle, I suppose I am just impatient with what seems to be her naïveté—something Nico pointed out in class. On p. 160 Straker writes, “I did not want this messy and terrible experience embodying violence and brutality to become part of us. I wanted violence and brutality to remain in the Other (i.e., the State).” I don’t understand this. Does she really believe that in a state of siege, in a state of war, in the brutal white police state that was South Africa under apartheid that there would be neat divisions of good and bad, purity and evil? Brutal police states are gory structures. Revolutions are gory responses. My surprise is that she was shocked and appalled to hear Stanley’s story. What did she expect she might hear? As a South African, she must have known of “the bitter [and bloody] struggle against apartheid [that] made soldiers out of children and turned black townships into breakaway armed camps” (Scheper-Hughes 1996: 896).
The fact of her own surprise is the red flag. Yet she doesn’t examine this. She never really explores how her own [race/class] privilege continued to shield her from the full horror of apartheid, even as we go through all the pages of the article. It is not enough to say as she does on p. 154 that, “I had unwittingly allowed myself to be shielded from the full horror of apartheid. This cocooning…was not unusual, as the whole social structure…supported this sequestering”). Yes, by the end of the article she comes to recognize that violent structures (from colonialism to apartheid) generate atrocities (pp. 162-163). But I don’t see how she connects this “understanding” to her own “coming to terms with [Stanley’s] act” (p. 161). Indeed, I don’t think she does. I think she conflates “understanding” with approval. I feel that if she truly “unpacked” her own privileged positionality in the history and context of the nation that Straker and Stanley call home, she might also realize that to understand does not mean to condone. And if she can truly come to understand Stanley’s own struggle, his own suffering as a result of what he did, it’s at that point, I think, that her own “subjectivity” would not keep getting in the way of her being the very best counsel to Stanley she can be (p. 162: “…I felt my subjectivity challenged once again”).
I find it very difficult to contribute here, or at least develop an argument, since this is all based on (psychological) theory—something, as Professor Stein pointed out several times, we cannot see or feel.
First, to Professor Waterston’s critique on Straker’s minimal self-reflection:
I think both characters have a moral dilemma. It can be argued that we don’t know if Stanley does, since we’re not in his head, but I would say he does based on the details given and his involvement in the murder.
In response to, “If Straker’s [moral dilemma], what is the choice about a future action she is supposed to be struggling with?”
The choice that Straker is struggling with, I think, is how to respond to this observed dissociation in the most therapeutic way. For example on p. 161:
“I felt I had done as much as I could simply staying in some way present, albeit in a consciously experienced split and dissociated state with role reversals and fluctuating identifications and wish to be out of the room, yet paradoxically wishing to stay in contact.”
And then continued: “Any comment I could have made would have attempted to engage Stanley’s fear in regard to his transgression.”
For any type of analyst, anything you say or do is an intervention. I can imagine—based on Straker’s thoughts here—that she was deeply conflicted with how to respond in a fashion conducive to continuing the exploration of Stanley’s life.
I guess the counter-argument proposed here is that the struggle Straker faces is caused by her own subjectivity (and one that is not fully explored). And perhaps this conflict being attributed to Stanley’s actions does not give the full picture (i.e. lacking a race analysis and the complex events), but it must also be noted that, in the middle of p. 160, Straker does talk about her “white guilt,” starting with “Nevertheless…” and ending at “…State.”
I do believe and stick by my opinion, however, that such contextual details of Stanley's life are needed as a precursor to her self-disclosure. I would assume that her position as a psychoanalyst plays a large role in this—in her mind, and from her workings with Stanley, this was the formulation that she came up with. In her conceptualization, Stanley was facing a psychological conflict/moral dilemma (dissociation). This emotionally charged exchange created such feelings. Despite her lack of elaboration on certain aspects of race and the current situation, I don’t doubt that Straker incorporated these into her formulation. For example, p. 162, first paragraph: “Over time he too had to grapple with how many of our differences were a function of class, gender, power, and race positions…”
Of course, we can debate which details should have been added/omitted, how the paper should have been organized, etc. Our own subjectivities and fields of interest may lead us to these critiques, but we should also take on board Prof. Reitz’s thoughts that this may have just been a mere matter of practicality for presentation purposes. Not that that may provide any particular respite to the critique-ers, but I think Straker set out with a clear (but broad) purpose in her paper—to show the importance of self-reflection and confrontation of the analyst’s feelings—and that that purpose was fulfilled. Maybe it could have been achieved better using different methods, but Straker utilized her psychological knowledge—assessing her own countertransference (her “stuff” and related feelings/thoughts toward Stanley) and relating it to Stanley’s story.
Thank you for this post Sylvie. This has truly been an interesting discussion as it always is when discussing the human psyche.
I will first address Sylvie’s initial question that Professor Waterston so kindly analyzed further. I readily admit that I do not exactly have an opinion on the specificity of Professor Waterston’s argument, as it seems to attack the formatting of the article rather than the content. What I mean here is that we are interrogating Straker for not shifting the focus of the article on herself as she discusses the problem of dissociation and separation of self and how each affects us during times of moral crisis. However, when discussing the content of this article, I do think that Straker relays her overall message, which is to help other psychologist in the field understand how dissociation and separation of self affects people in during struggle. We are arguing as if Straker attempted to provide us a solution for Stanley’s actions or feelings but this does not seem to be the case. Nico and Sally mentioned that we need some type of critical race analysis for Starker’s argument to be successful and in some sense this is true. If Straker were writing for other psychologist in Africa for instance, than a critical race theory will provide further insight to the population of study and assist the overall study. But is this insight necessary for Straker’s argument? She discusses how Stanley’s splitting of his personality affected his subjectivity, which eventually affected her subjectivity putting her selves into conflict. In my opinion, critical race analysis and even a further explanation of her surprise to Stanley’s actions here will serve to make an argument to find a solution to this feeling; Straker does not aim to tackle that question.
This is not to say that there is no credibility to Professor Waterston’s argument. To say that Straker does not adequately explain her own surprise to Stanley’s actions is true to the extent that we, as the reader, would like to know more about how Straker was affected by the struggle against apartheid rather than Stanley’s narrative about his struggle. However, Stanley’s struggle puts Straker in a position of moral paralyses, meaning she can not come to grips with her own identity resulting from Stanley’s narrative. But why are Stanley’s narratives not sufficient enough to explain Straker’s moral crisis, especially when she discusses how Maki’s death affected her and how her subjectivity was in conflict after the fact? Straker’s white guilt for instance helps us understand that as a white person she had no choice but to have some type of tie to the other whereas internally she sided completely with the oppressed. This gets to the heart of her argument because she explains the conflict between her selves that I feel is really clear her. To be double binded between what she thought her duty is and how others portray her made her struggle to find a balance within. It appears to me that Straker fulfilled the purpose of her article to explain the event clearly enough for us to fully understand her interpretation of subjectivity, how dissociation affects people in general, and how actions that may seem necessary during war still have a negative impact on the actor when the turmoil subsides.
Re-shifting the discussion back to Sylvie’s post and the content of the article, we arrive at the moral crisis that Straker, Stanley and Maki faced. Straker’s was her listening to Stanley’s story, which placed her private and social self against one another. The moral dilemma was finding that balance. Stanley’s moral dilemma was coming to grips with his decision but not because he was sad about the event. It seemed that Stanley’s dilemma was in his private self’s weakness as his political self fought for, what he thought, was right. Stanley had to admit that he hesitated when he smelt Maki’s hair burning and that hesitation caused him much discomfort and turmoil. Maki’s moral crisis was indeed the worst of all. She was savagely beaten and eventually burned at a stake and later in the story we learn that she may have been wrongly accused as the state attempted to put blacks against other blacks. Her moral dilemma was when she attempted to pull her skirt down in as she was being thrashed. Straker explains this as an act of humanity in the midst of complete inhumanity. She clung one to what she could control and that was to not have herself portrayed as indecent even with the charges brought up against her.
This all occurred because of the apartheid system. The erasure of this system will not stop humans from acting or reacting this way in the face of turmoil and narratives but it will prevent some actions and provide some stability. Stability, freedom, and equality are necessary conditions to combat the need for dissociation and separation of selves and allow for us to be truly subjective and present one self that we are proud of.
Thank you all for your much-valued inputs. I would like to share a few additional thoughts on this topic.
In the process of writing this post, I noticed my inadequate ability to fully understand how the profound disturbance of Stanley's story has traumatized Straker's moral consciousness. I then decided to try to examine this issue from Straker's perspective by watching the video of Maki Skosana's death. After viewing this video, my sympathy for the armed struggle against the apartheid system was immediately confronted by my moral consciousness as I was struggling to find a balance in my moral values by convincing myself that this is the action of a few, and it does not represent the whole anti-apartheid movement. However, the method I used to clam my moral crisis was not available to Straker at the time since she was looking directly at the man who perpetrated the crime.
Below is the link to that video, and please be wary of its graphic content.
http://youtu.be/Sf39waktLVQ
Here is another point to begin the thinking about the issue of moral ambiguity. After the fall of the apartheid system, the anti-white violence in South Africa became widespread. The violence against Afrikaners continues up until today, but in the most part, mainstream media choose to overlook these issues. I believe that this is a moral ambiguity taking place on a mass-scale. Given that it is indisputable that violence of any form is inherently wrong, what has constituted the mainstream media’s hesitation to openly condemn these racially motivated crimes against Afrikaners? Could it be the result of a blurred distinction between victim and crime perpetrator? But this phenomenon has certainly raised a question in minds of many people, including myself: is it ever appropriate to condemn the victims of the apartheid system, who suffered tremendously under the brutality of white rule for generations?
Hi Sylvie, thanks for the provocative blog, I must admit that coming into class on Thursday I did not view this piece as being so provocative or complex as it turned out to be and I was a bit confused as to why it had become so complex. I think that I left the class feeling more perplexed about the article then when I went in. However, I do think that there are many aspects that should be explored further and the discussion is very engaging.
I like to respond to your first question by stating that I understand Professor Waterston’s critique of Straker’s piece and the fact that she was not as “self-reflective” as the article will have us believe. My understanding of the article is that Straker starts to reflect on her “moral dilemma” but then she makes what can be construed as apologies for being white and for not doing more with what her “white privilege” provides, what Straker calls her “white guilt”. I understand that for Straker the ability to understand her clients feelings and position meant that she had to condone violent actions and if she did not understand the actions then how can she understand Stanley at all or the sentiments of so many people in his position. However this is exactly what I agree is missing form her piece, though like Professor Waterston points out we have not read her other pieces we are only looking at this one piece, Straker does not elaborate on what is her dilemma and how does she manage to resolve this inner conflict in order to become a better analyst for Stanley.
I also agree with Sally and Nico, that Straker did not elaborate on some of the points she brought up in her piece but rather made comments which she did not attempt to clarify or discuss any further regarding her white guilt or her moral dilemmas, in regards to the violent events. If the piece was meant to portray more of Stanley’s moral dilemmas then the article should have been named differently.
In regards to you second question I do think Stanley is experiencing moral dilemmas and I think his experience is more intense and pronounced then Straker’s. Stanley wants or wanted to do the right thing and even when the actions and circumstances were not correct, in his world there were done for the correct cause. I think Stanley has to struggle with the knowledge that he acted against his personal feelings for the good of the cause and his dilemma is more intense and vivid then Straker’s dilemma. I think the fact that Apartheid is no longer present, does not take away the implications left behind by the violent actions or by the circumstances and emotions that led to more acts of violence. The evil of Apartheid is no longer present only in the sense that it is not presently occurring but its evil and the damages it caused on the psyche of millions of people will always remain. I think damages that lingers on in both Stanley and Straker’s, mind is a dilemma that both will have to deal with for the remainder of their lives. However I do agree that Straker did not expand or articulate her reflection on the impact of this experience had on her moral self.
What a great post and discussion!
As for the initial question, I will say that I agree with Professors Waterstons position. While I may agree with Jose and Andre in that the aims of the paper by Straker was not to address the profound and complex issue of apartheid South Africa, but rather to address a problem within the paradigm of therapeutic practices. Professor Stein mentioned that this was the primary goal in writing the paper, and that this would be presented, the majority of times, to a group of people who come from that world – therapists. But I must ask, and this still bothers my a great deal – even if this was presented to a room full of therapist and only therapist, is it not essential to have this discussion of a moral crisis in the lens of a critical race analysis? I mean, this is tackling a problem within a therapeutic environment but the context is Apartheid South Africa! How can we not first delve into the issues of race, agency, authority, white privilege and guilt first? One can argue that Straker does this, but it is inadequate. By acknowledging white guilt does not mean you are critical of that guilt, of privilege, or of why one was so morally shocked at why Stanley helped in the burning of a woman.
And to the topic of subjectivity. This may be controversial to say, and I am still critical of my own position, but hasn’t history demonstrated that there are certain things that do not rely on the subjectivity of the individual? Slavery. The Holocaust. Mass Incarceration. Sex trafficking. How subjective can we be when looking at these dark historical events, events that had such large and detrimental consequences to the entirety of society? Can we justify someone saying “it wasn’t that bad” and simply blame it on their subjectivity? Straker acknowledges the fact that Apartheid is an “ultimate evil” and that the struggle to be free from it was a necessary one – however, she does not seem to be more critical of the fact she is conflicted when it comes to the violence committed by Stanley. This, for me, is the crux of the problem. Her lack of being more critical of her own reactions and position when it comes to Apartheid South Africa, which in my opinion, is far more imperative to understand in order to be able to understand certain situations and emotional responses, such as those Straker has during her therapy sessions with Stanley.
First, to Professor Waterston’s critique on Straker’s minimal self-reflection: I believe that Professor Waterston brings up a valid point on the notion that Straker speaks more about her moral dilemma than Stanley dilemma. When I first read the article I got the notion that the article was supposed to explain about Stanley decision, however during the class the title became a very important issue because the title “A crises in the Subjectivity of the Analyst: The Trauma of Morality” The title gives the conception that is displayed in the article. So I believe the article reflects the title. I think I would agree with Professor Waterston that the author isn’t specific on who moral dilemma that is being focus. Although I do agree with Joseph that our own subjectivities may lead to different critiques and that since it was presented at a conference that it may affect the format of the paper.
In regards to the second question, I don’t believe Straker was the only person experiencing moral dilemma; however I never really got an indication that show otherwise for the reference in the article about the burning hair. The overall impression that I got from the article was that Stanley just did what had to be done in regards to the girl; he was willing to do anything deemed necessary to stop the oppression.
I do not believe that Stanley’s combative social identity never expired after the collapse of apartheid instead, I believe that it became reclusive and dormant. In the article when Stanley was asked about his role as an accomplice in the murder of Maki Skosama, Straker said pg. 158 “He became very excited and animated as if caught in an awful jouissance, a sexual pleasure. “ This identity is still very much there however it just became apparent if the situation calls for it. I believe Stanley is still confident in his actions, I also believe that he believe that it was necessary however in the retelling of his experiences he created a standard for himself which at one point he became fearful that he was not living up to the standard. Page 159 “However in this moment of awareness I was amazed to find that Stanley seemed to expect me to condemn him for his fearful reaction when Maki Skosana was ignited”.
Hello Sylvie,
Thank you for your post!
In regards to your first question, I agree with Professor Waterston’s position. I too wondered whose moral dilemma is really being discussed. Though I understand that Straker is in a session with Stanley and her job to is understand where he is coming from in order to assist him, the story mainly reflects on his story and his conflict with his own moral conflict. Throughout the piece, Straker never clearly states what her personal moral dilemma is or how she solves those moral conflicts to better understand Stanley. Particularly with Straker’s point about “white privilege,” as Sally brought up, she never exactly defines what white privilege means to her or how she really felt about the violent acts going on at the time. The focus is all placed on Stanley’s story.
As Straker stated at the beginning of the text, she essentially left Africa in her late 20’s (not only to take the position as psychologist in the United States), but to also run away from the violence going on because of apartheid. Her sessions with Stanley forced her to face the reality that she had tried to run away from. However, I believe that part of Straker is still dissociated from reality and the reason why she focuses so much on Stanley’s story is because she tries to find meaning for her own life in his story, which still doesn’t clarify her moral conflicts.
In regards to your second question, I do not believe that Stanley’s combative social identity has expired after the collapse of apartheid. He still dissociated from his private and political self and uses his political self to justify his actions because he acted on the will of the people. As Straker stated in Stanley’s account of what happened to Maki Skosana, “He became very excited and animated as if caught in an awful jouissance, a sexualized pleasure… I was also stunned that throughout his entire narrative, Stanley showed no awareness of my presence, except when he described the moment that Maki Skosana was set alight” (Straker, 2007, pp. 158). Even now, Stanley doesn’t necessarily show any guilt of what he did. He still dissociates himself when he recounts that horrific day. I believe that if he was searching for his private self again, he would feel more remorse and aware of what he had did, as opposed to going back into a trance and justifying his actions by the will of what society wanted at the time.
This is the fourth year that we have “taught” Straker’s article. The richness of this discussion and the controversy it always stirs argues that it is exactly the right article to bring into the classroom. We struggle. As does Straker. And Stanley.
In previous years, Prof. Waterston and I have engaged in a back and forth on the blog that I believe models scholarly debate in a way that is quite useful to students. I hope that we did this in class as well. For those of you who would like to read the Straker postings for a year where I think our comments were especially interesting and provocative, you can do so at: http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=2624156454087184832&postID=7985081206846076292.
I feel like you guys have already done an astounding job analyzing the article as well as critiquing its weaknesses. I felt moved almost to tears when reading some of your posts. It happened when Sylvie asked, “is it safe to assume that Stanley’s combative social identity has expired after the collapse of apartheid, and he is now compelled to search for the private self that he has lost during the period of political struggles, namely the innocent Stanley who loves his family and had never kill anyone before the death of Maki Skosana?” and when Andre called attention to the image of Maki Skosana trying to pull down her skirt while burning and framed it as another moral dilemma. Indeed. So, this year, instead of engaging in that particular argumentative stream, I wanted to point out some things happening amongst us as we struggle. Therapists call this “parallel process” when people discussing something simultaneously engage (unconsciously) in the very behaviors they are discussing.
Continued in next post...
In 2010, a student remarked to me about the contentious postings that he felt extremely uncomfortable, as if he was witnessing an argument between two parents and would be forced to “choose” between them. This is an example of the kind of affective struggle we experience, even when we believe we are dealing in pure intellect. We tend to dissociate one or the other of these selves to avoid the cognitive dissonance. And we also want to have one side-Waterston OR Stein-hold the morally superior position just as Straker says there is a struggle in wanting to make all that is bad/good reside in either the State or the Movement, when the reality is much more complex.
Second, I could not help but notice how once we engaged around the moment of Stanley’s “trauma”-the murder-we had trouble focusing on tons of other information given in the article both before and after this very primal moment. It is a good example of the way that trauma, even secondhand, commands our attention so muscularly that it both obliterates memory for its precursors and causes little else to be processed in its aftermath.
Third, I am struck by how unfailing we cling to whichever particular iconic image of the victim gives us sustenance and support for our moral/ethical/intellectual position. Straker proposed that both her own and Stanley’s multiplicity of inherently contradictory responses in a complex situation needed to be embraced and integrated rather than being allowed to remain one-dimensional. This notion was, at the time, a potentially threatening idea in a field that traditionally pathologized patients and left therapists on a supposedly “neutral” perch. Straker questioned this self-serving dissociation.
Straker was, as far as I know, one of the first clinician/activist/writers to begin exploring the various privileges of psychoanalysts in regards to their patients. Wherever people who have been oppressed seek psychological help, they are likely to have to go to members of the oppressing class because they have often been the only ones given access to the education and credentialing. So White therapists largely fought for and provided treatment for child victims of apartheid like Stanley, just as Jewish psychiatrists work with victims in Gaza, and upper middle class MSWs and psychologists treat poor Americans in social service settings. I bet that most of the people who work in your agencies are not of the same race and class as the clients. This is an enormous problem but I hope that its solution comes not in barring people who are different from their clients from working but from a greater examination of the complexity and struggle of those relationships, which Straker offers.
I really don't know how to follow these excellent responses, though I am really struck by Professor Stein's point that our class and blog discussions have in some ways reproduced the issues Straker was asking us to think about.
I also want to underscore Professor Stein's point that -- as in all things -- we must investigate how our own perspective shapes what we receive as the "truth" of any given text. As with "In a Grove," Sally admitted to wanting to distrust anything that came from the perspective of the state, some of us felt that gender was an issue in determining reliability while others saw things through a more criminal justice lens and felt that the full, high-stakes confession rang true. Revolutionaries? Feminists? Criminologists? I would ask each of you to reflect on what you brought to this reading, whether that be feelings about apartheid, therapy, privilege or morality. How did this shape the way you received Straker's tale?
As I said in class, one of the ways I approach anything is as an English professor. Form and language tend to be my first lens. I see much in Straker's language that acknowledges that her form (a polished conference paper for other therapists) does not have the adequate space to cover the many many issues raised. For example, she admits that the reasons for her flight from and return to South Africa were complicated and unable to be considered at this time. I imagine that with 20 additional pages on these decisions, we might have heard a great deal about her racial identity and growing realization about its relationship to power. Similarly,as the title indicates, her subjectivity is the issue and she concludes that it is always already fragmented. Her two different reactions to Skosana's murder (her viewing of the tv event and Stanley's description) have to both be seen as representations of awful violence around which her subjective responses are formed. I think Professor Stein is right that our perhaps over-valuing of the Stanley paragraph is about the primal scene, but this is not Straker's first encounter with this. Perhaps part of the shock is the coincidence that he was there. Far from not understanding Stanley's position, I think she understands and it is that -- the untenability of any single position (political and/or psychological)-- that is the trauma of her title.
Hello Verons!
Thank you Sylvia for the passionate point. Sorry the late post; organizing the event has been quite hectic. Just today, a meeting with the director of public safety, dean of students, and director of student life were needed.
First, I want to point out that the class on Thursday was terrific, especially since Professor Stein was able to clarify what Straker was trying to convey in her paper. Although I know nothing about psychological analysis, it seemed like Straker's moral dilemma was unclear. In fact, I would have to disagree with Joe. I don't think that both Stanely and Straker had moral dilemmas because it seemed pretty clear to me that Straker was the only one who had a clear moral dilemma. In some ways, I agree with Nico in the shared view that Straker was unclear on what Stanley's moral dilemma was. Although I believe that Professor Stein and Professor Reitz make compelling points, Straker's article was primarily speaking to other psychologists working in environments with similar horrors associated with violence and war.
In regard to the first question, I tend to agree with Professor Waterson because raise good questions on Straker's analysis because Straker speaks for Stanley. In some ways, Straker's attempts to make Stanley feel guilty made me feel uncomfortable. Not once throughout the whole analysis did Stanley say at all that the killing of Maki Skoma was unjustified and wrong. This omission highlights the ways in which Straker is a part of the privileged population under apartheid. She feels the need in some ways to speak for the individuals who are most oppressed, such as Stanley.
I agree one-hundred percent that Straker was the only one experiencing a moral dilemma. Towards the end of the article, Straker acknowledges that her white guilt got to her. To me, it seems highly impossible to disconnect race and psychological analysis when dealign within apartheid in South Africa, especially when she a part of the privileged under apartheid. Similarly, although Stanley may have questions the reasons why he killed Maki, I still do not think it is was strong enough for Straker to make the claim that Stanley was undergoing a moral dilemma.
Sylvie's final question mirrors a similar question that Nico and I debated today regarding the situation is Gaza with Hamas. Nico asked me whether I thought the actions of Hamas were wrong and whether they should be condemned. Although I don't condone any form of violence, I am in the difficult position to disconnect myself limited imagination which is shaped by my experiences. As much as I can understand discrimination and police brutality, I will never know what it is like for Palestinians living within Gaza. Nico and I continued to go back and forth for a while; he condemned the actions of Hamas while I cautioned by judgement but argue the tactics being used go against my beliefs. So, is it relevant for us, as activists, to have this conversation dealing with the criticism of victims of oppression? Before Nelson Mandela became the President of South Africa, he was considered a terrorist and sentenced to a lifetime in jail. The lines between who is right and who is wrong tend to be blurred despite the gains in technology.
This was a very challenging post for me--not only due to the intellectual nature of the comments, but the diversity of opinion among them.
First, I'm not totally sure whether I agree with Professor Waterston's argument. "I do not feel that Straker is as self-reflective as the title of her piece suggests..." I feel like Straker devotes a good majority of her paper to analyzing "the Subjectivity of the Analyst" (e.g. herself). It's obvious by just looking at how many times she uses the words "I", "myself", and "my" in the second half of the paper. I do not believe that she focuses too much on Stanley, but rather uses her encounter with him to frame her own "moral dilemma." I don't understand why Straker must have "a choice about a future action" in order to analyze her own moral dilemma. The definition is much too rigid--if Straker was witnessing Stanley's dissociation, then her dilemma was one of acceptance: could she accept the Stanley who she had come to respect as a young, adept rebel, while also accepting the Stanley who had no remorse for a brutal, merciless act? So, as Joseph argues, Straker indeed went through a moral dilemma.
In this regard, I accept Professor Waterston's remark that she comes off as a bit naive, and the paper itself is a bit flawed. But I do believe that Straker does go through a moral dilemma, and she does attempt to be somewhat self-reflective.
In response to Sylvie's second question, I did not believe Stanley was going through a moral dilemma, but as Professor Stein mentioned, the perspective you offered is moving. The possibility is there, and you make a strong argument--Stanley could have been going through a moral dilemma. But, due to his dissociation, I'm not ready to fully believe that he indeed had a moral dilemma, or whether he himself can denote whether he had one. The biggest problem for me is the dissociation. And Straker's paper. Not enough analysis is provided to tell whether or not he had one. As a therapist, she would be able to provide this answer--but it is mentioned nowhere in the paper. So I don't know. While Sylvie offers a brilliant perspective, it is presumptive.
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